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On April 3, in a speech before members of the Rocky Mountain Council on Latin American Studies
(REMCLAS) in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) officer Richard
Fletcher addressed the origins and development of the foreign debt crisis affecting Latin American
and Caribbean nations, and selected debt management strategies. Fletcher is Acting Manager for
the IDB's Department of Plans and Programs. Fletcher highlighted three "unusual" features of
the debt crisis: 1) The long-term nature of the problem. In fact, he said, the debt problem cannot
technically be defined as a "crisis," since the latter is usually understood to be a relatively shortterm phenomenon. 2) Breadth of the crisis. The debt crisis affects 30 countries in the hemisphere. 3)
Depth of the problem, which was described as the "greatest economic crisis in this century."
The IDB official pointed out that since 1980, investment in the region has declined by a third,
imports have dropped by half, and gross domestic product has declined an average 10%. Next, he
added, even if sustained economic growth is resumed by 1990, on a per capita basis Latin Americans
will be no better off than they were 10 years ago. Moreover, the dedication of economic resources
to debt service payments and the corresponding economic losses of the 1980s will have negative
consequences throughout the 1990s. In this regard, Fletcher mentioned that reduced social welfare
spending and poor economic performance will result in higher infant mortality and malnutrition
rates, declining literacy rates and in education in general.
Fletcher then summarized the difference between the current debt crisis scenario, and Latin
American borrowing patterns in the post-WWII era. In the three decades preceding the debt crisis,
he said, debt was perceived by most economists as a vehicle of development, an "engine of growth."
The IDB, he pointed out, was created in this context. In the post-war period, he stated, most foreign
debt received by Latin American and Caribbean nations was linked to expanding productive
capacity.
Next, real interest rates were quite low, averaging between one and two percent. Consequently, the
debt effectively created conditions for repayment. Fletcher then declared that during the 1950s and
1960s the results of using debt for productive capacity growth in Latin America were spectacular.
Indicators of economic and social welfare, he said, were vastly improved, such as per capita income,
and infant mortality and literacy rates. At this juncture, the IDB official provided a broad outline of
the origins of the debt crisis. In 1973, he said, the first "oil shock" occurred, creating a huge surplus
of dollars which the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) nations placed in shortterm deposits in European banks.
According to Fletcher, this petrodollar bonanza averaged about $100 billion per year. Since
the banks were paying interest on these deposits, they were anxious to loan the money out.
Consequently, Fletcher said, for the first time in recent memory, big private banks were actually
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seeking out Latin American finance ministers. Borrowing foreign capital became especially
irresistible because real interest rates were negative. An important feature of this "abundance of
capital flowing to Latin America" is that it was not necessarily tied to productive investment. In fact,
he said, a large portion of the new loans was dedicated to consumption expenditures and covering
fiscal deficits.
Fletcher then pointed out that only two nations resisted "borrowing as much as possible": Colombia
and Barbados. These two nations have been spared much of the pain experienced by all other Latin
American and Caribbean nations, by not being forced to implement economic austerity policies
devolving from huge foreign debt service requirements.
Next, the IDB official mentioned that in 1979, shortly after the second "oil shock," Federal Reserve
Board chairman Paul Volcker, acted to bring a halt to US inflation. This process was initiated
by curtailing the US money supply, which provoked a recession. Subsequently, prices for Latin
American export commodities declined, as other western nations enacted similar policies, thereby
squeezing world markets. Fletcher stated that the impact of US monetary policy changes were
not immediately felt because the second oil shock brought about another "burst of liquidity." At
this time, he added, many Latin American governments were accumulating more debt, a large
proportion of which went to make interest payments instead of productive investment. Then in the
early 1980s, the petrodollar market began drying up.
According to Fletcher, this development was the outcome of two basic factors: many OPEC
customers had reduced their dependency on foreign oil via substitution programs, and the OPEC
nations had significantly increased their imports. Combined with tight money policies by the US
and major western European nations, the reduction of petrodollars led to the escalation of interest
rates. Then in 1982, Mexico's declaration of sheer impossibility of keeping up with debt service
payments was the official beginning of the debt crisis.
At this time, said Fletcher, two positions on the nature of the debt crisis and its solution emerged.
One position argued that the debt crisis was essentially a problem of debt service obligations
exceeding productive capacity. Debt payment rescheduling was the solution. The other position
defined the debt crisis as a liquidity problem, result of the cessation of bank lending. The solution,
then, would be a renewal of bank lending.
Fletcher stated that the second position prevailed, at least until 1985. After the Mexican declaration,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) took a leading role in debt management, "whipping"
payment schedules and bank commitments together on the basis of debtor nations' agreements
to accept IMF conditionality. By 1985, however, economists recognized that this strategy was not
working. The IDB official asserted the explanation for the failure of strategy could be explained by
the fact that Latin American debt payment capacity had not improved while regional GDP declined
alongside increasing trade surpluses. GDP/debt service ratio and the trade surplus/debt service
ratios had not improved.
In brief, said Fletcher, increasing the trade surplus at the expense of domestic consumption,
combined with other economic sacrifices, were wholly inadequate toward making debt service
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payments while simultaneously increasing debt payment capacity. Next, in 1985, the Peruvian
government offered its own unique solution to the problem, declaring that it would dedicate only
10% of export earnings to debt service. By late 1985, the US government finally entered with its own
debt management strategy, introduced by Treasury Secretary James Baker in October. The Baker
Plan consisted of increased bank loans, greater involvement by the multilateral development bank
institutions, and economic policy reform on the part of debtor nations.
According to Fletcher, the Baker Plan was a welcome change in the sense that it reintroduced the
concept of using loan monies to increase productive capacity. Nevertheless, the Baker Plan is an
inadequate response to the problem. The IDB economist asserted that even assuming the complete
adoption of the Plan, if Latin American nations continue to make debt service payments at current
levels, resources would be insufficient for domestic investment, and the purchase of necessary
imports.
Thus, said Fletcher, the "policy side" to the problem has received attention, but the "resources
side" requires further investigation and action. The economist then mentioned alternative debt
management strategies, such as those introduced by Democrat Senator Bill Bradley, and recent
additions to the omnibus trade bill currently under debate in the US Congress. The Bradley plan,
he said, was interesting in the sense that the Senator had brought to the attention of politicians and
the public the relationship between Latin American nations' economic difficulties and US economic
consequences. In effect, Bradley's plan is grounded on the recognition that until Latin America
experiences economic recovery, between $90 billion and $60 billion in US exports are lost annually,
with corresponding negative effects on employment in the United States.
The other interesting feature of this strategy, said Fletcher, is its long-term, and thus, more realistic,
nature. Debt service obligations would be substantially reduced over a long period of time, perhaps
for an entire decade. Regarding the debt strategy contained within the omnibus trade legislation,
Fletcher emphasized that it would spread out the costs of the debt burden between debtors and
creditors. Part of the legislation would require the establishment of a so-called debt adjustment
facility to buy "problem debt" from the banks. The facility would be used by debtor nations which
accept policy reforms.
Next, US bank regulations would be changed to permit the banks to write-down non-performing
loans with reduced negative results. The creation of these and other mechanisms contained in the
legislation would permit phasing out the unpayable debt over perhaps a 10-year period. At this
juncture, Fletcher asserted there is no "costless way" of solving the problem. Although the debt
adjustment facility and the Bradley plan represent more constructive ways of dealing with the debt
issue, Fletcher stated these strategies cannot command the necessary political consensus at this time
to become US policy.
Regarding the danger of the approximately $140 billion in "bad debt" to the overall wealth of the
US economy, Fletcher declared that the impact is miniscule. The real issue here, he said, is that the
debt is concentrated in about nine big US banks. It is unrealistic to assume that these banks could
willingly, or by government fiat, write-off a large portion of the loans causing Latin American debtor
nations major difficulties. According to Fletcher, having US taxpayers assume at least a portion of
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the big banks' losses is sensible. He argued that for every dollar spent by taxpayers in this bailout operation, the US economy would benefit over time at least four- or five-fold in the form of
increased US exports. The results of Latin American economic recovery would boost US exports,
and thus production and employment levels.

-- End --
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